On average, straddles on individual stocks earn significantly negative returns: daily holding period return is -0.19% and weekly holding period return is -2.09%. In sharp contrast, straddle returns are significantly positive around earnings announcements: average at-the-money straddle returns from one day before earnings announcement to the earnings announcement date yields a highly significant 2.3% return. The positive straddle returns around earnings announcements are robust to different stock and option characteristics. Furthermore, we find the positive straddle returns are more pronounced for smaller firms, firms with less analyst coverage, higher past jump frequency, higher kurtosis and more volatile past earnings surprises. This finding suggests that when the firm's information environment is less transparent, or when there is more noise in the firm's signals, investors are more likely to underestimate the uncertainty around earnings announcement days.
Introduction
A typical public firm makes quarterly earnings announcements, which are one of the most important corporate events. During this event, firm management reveals fundamental information about the firm, and investors respond actively to the information by comparing the announced fundamentals to their ex ante expectations. Earnings announcement periods are information intensive periods, and stock trading volume can increase by as much as 50%. This is also a period of high returns. Frazzini and Lamont (2006) find that 60% of a typical stock return can be achieved if investors trade only on each quarterly earnings announcement. Another wellknown fact for earnings announcements is that, no matter whether the earnings announcement brings good news or bad news, uncertainty builds up before the news and plummets afterwards.
Uncertainty is of key importance for asset pricing. Nevertheless, it is difficult to directly measure uncertainty, or investors' expectation of uncertainty. Given the drastic movements in uncertainty around earnings announcements, we consider earnings announcements to be a particularly interesting venue to study how investors form their expectations of firm's fundamental uncertainty. To our benefit, the date of future earnings announcement is usually made public ex ante 1 , which facilitates the separation between uncertainty of the event dates and uncertainty of firms fundamental.
The challenging question we address in this paper is: can investors correctly anticipate the uncertainty dynamics around earnings announcement? To focus directly on uncertainty rather than the direction of the news, we choose to adopt one particular option trading strategy, the 1 For instance, Wall Street Journal keeps an earnings calendar for public firms, indicating on which day the earnings will be announced. This data can be available months before the real announcement happens. According to Bagnoli, Kross, and Watts (2001) , 80% of firms in 1998 choose to report earnings on the expected announcement dates. Dubinsky and Johannes (2006) find all their 50 sample firms announced earnings on expected report dates, over 1996 to 2002. straddle. Straddles consist of a pair of call option and put option with matching strikes and maturity dates. In our empirical design, we focus on delta-neutral straddles, which allows one to trade on underlying uncertainty without any directional exposure to the underlying security.
Expected returns on straddles typically include a volatility risk premium and a jump risk premium. Absent of such premia, Coval and Shumway (2001) show that under mild assumptions, the expected return on delta-neutral straddles should be equal to the risk-free rate. Coval and Shumway (2001) further document that delta-neutral straddles on the S&P 500 index approximately earn a negative three percent return per week and interpret this as consistent with market volatility carrying a negative risk premium. We confirm Coval and Shumway's (2001) finding on straddle returns at the individual stock level. In particular, volume-weighted deltaneutral at-the-money individual stock straddles have an average return of -2.08% per week with a t-statistic of -42.35. At daily and monthly frequencies, the delta-neutral straddle earns -0.14%
and -16.21% on average, respectively. The negative straddle return is robust to volume weighting, open interest weighting and equal weighting.
Following the same reasoning, if the options market correctly forecasts the magnitude of the changes in uncertainty associated with earnings announcements, then straddle holders should earn similarly negative average returns around earnings announcements. In striking contrast, delta-neutral at-the-money straddles earn significantly positive returns during earnings announcement periods. As mentioned earlier, earnings announcement dates are scheduled ex ante and are public information appearing on almost all major financial websites from The Wall Street Journal to Yahoo! Finance. We construct straddles five, three, and one trading days before the scheduled earnings announcement date, and hold the straddle until the earnings announcement date or one day after the earnings announcement date. The daily straddle returns around earnings announcements are all significantly positive across all holding periods, ranging from 0.31% to 2.30%.
The contrast of significantly positive straddle returns around earnings announcements and significantly negative straddle returns over the whole sample is puzzling. Various mechanisms could be driving this result. One could argue that the positive straddle returns around earnings announcements represent compensation for risks. In this paper, we work with raw returns of delta-neutral straddles without any risk adjustments. Delta-neutral straddles normally have exposure to market volatility and jump risks as they are not vega-neutral. Previous studies, such as Cremers, Halling and Weinbaum (2012) , show that both market volatility risk and market jump risk carry significant and negative risk premia. So it is unlikely that the positive straddle returns around earning announcement represent compensation for negatively-priced risk factors.
Positive straddle returns clearly indicate that the market underestimate the uncertainties around earnings announcement days. We believe a firm's information environment can substantially affect investor's expectation about future uncertainty. If the firm's information environment is transparent, or if there is less noise in the firm's signals, it would be presumably easier for investors to form a more accurate expectation about future uncertainty, and vice versa.
That is, the underestimation of uncertainty and positive straddle returns would be more pronounced for firms with less transparent information environment and firms with noisier signals. Indeed, our empirical results in cross section show that We find firms with smaller size, less analyst coverage, higher historical volatilities, higher historical jump frequencies, larger historical jump sizes, larger historical earnings surprises and more volatile past earnings surprises all experience stronger underestimation of uncertainty and higher straddle returns around earnings announcements. Those are the firms with either less transparent information environment or more noisy signals in the price and earnings processes.
The information environment or noise can affect straddle returns through three nonexclusive channels. First, according to Hilbert (2012) , behavioral biases become more severe when there is more noise in the signal. A particular relevant behavioral bias is conservatism, meaning that investors are too slow to draw inferences from data, which leads to investors'
under-reaction to information in the data. In our case, when investors anticipate the uncertainty to arrive and get resolved around earnings announcements, conservatism means that they underestimate the magnitude of uncertainty the event brings to the price process. Second, rational investors might have ambiguity-aversion preference. During earnings announcement period, some investor might shun away from stock options prior to earnings announcement because they are averse to the ambiguity associated with the events, which might cause the price not fully incorporating all relevant information. Meanwhile, The magnitude of ambiguity presumably increases when information environment becomes worse, or signals become noisier.
Finally, Merton (1987) argues it is costly to obtain information. So it could be the case that even with earnings announcement dates publicly available on most financial websites, investors still fail to incorporate this information into option prices, because it is costly to obtain precise information about future uncertainty, and it is more so for firms with less transparent information environment or firms with noisier signals. All three channels work in the same direction, and are consistent with our empirical results.
Meanwhile, we observe increased transaction costs, measured by quoted spreads, in options market around earnings announcements. But even in the existence of higher transaction costs, straddles around earnings announcements still deliver significant and positive returns when we focus on short-term options with more liquidity, which clearly indicates that the options market inefficiency and limits of arbitrage are unable to explain the positive straddle returns altogether.
Our paper is closely related to the line of research which studies option returns including straddle returns, such as Coval and Shumway (2001) . While Coval and Shumway (2001) looks at option return at index level, Goyal and Saretto (2009) examines cross-sectional differences in straddle returns, and finds that straddles on stocks with larger differences between historical realized volatility and implied volatility tend to have higher returns. Goyal and Saretto (2009) interpret their results to be consistent with the Barberis and Huang (2001) hypothesis that people display both loss aversion and mental accounting. Another related paper is Govindaraj, Liu and Livnat (2012) , which examines whether there exists any return difference among the straddle portfolio with the lowest and highest past earnings surprises. While with a very different focus, Govindaraj et al (2012) also document significant positive straddles returns using a larger window around earnings announcement.
Our study is also related to behavioral biases and market efficiency literature in the options market. Stein (1989) is the first to document there is over-reaction in the long-term implied volatility on S&P 100 index as they move by same amount as in the short-term implied volatility. Poteshman (2001) examines the same issue using S&P 500 index options and find evidence for both long-term over-reaction and short-term under-reaction. The rationales for financial market over-reaction and under-reaction are mostly based on behavioral explanations.
Ni and Lemmon (2010) show that there is a significant difference in clienteles between the index options and individual stock options. Compared to index options trading, which is largely dominated by institutions, the stock options market is mainly driven by individual investors.
Individual options traders are more likely to exhibit the cognitive biases than institutional traders, which is consistent with our empirical results. In terms of market efficiency measured by transaction costs, De Fontnouvelle, Fishe and Harris (2003) , Mayhew (2002) , and Battalio, Hatch and Jennings (2004) all find that options market efficiency improves (to different degrees) around 2000s when the options market move towards a national system.
Our paper is one of the first to document a puzzling empirical phenomenon: positive and significant straddle returns around earnings announcements, in sharp contrast to significantly negative straddle returns on stocks. The finding in our paper is a challenge for current options pricing models, which do not generate such implications. The positive straddle returns around earnings announcement periods are pronounced for firms with less transparent information environment and more noise in their signals. It is possible that the underestimation of uncertainty could be driven by behavioral bias such as conservatism, rational preference as ambiguity aversion, or costly information led market inefficiency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data. Section 3 presents the main findings of positive straddle returns around earnings announcement periods. In section 4, we examine straddle returns in the cross-section. In Section 5, we discuss the effect of transaction costs. Section 6 concludes.
Data
Our sample period is January 1996 to December 2010. We obtain information about the underlying stocks, such as stock returns and characteristics, accounting data, and earnings announcement data from CRSP, COMPUSTAT, and IBES, respectively. Our option data is from Option Metrics, which provides end-of-day bid and ask quotes, open interests, volumes, implied volatilities and option Greeks for all listed options. We only include options with 10 to 60 days to maturity on common stocks with prices of at least $5. We take the mid-quote value as a fair reflection of the option price and require it to be at least $0.125. To filter out erroneous observations, we require bid and ask price to satisfy basic arbitrage bounds.
2 At the time of the straddle formation, we include only options with an absolute delta between 0.375 and 0.625 (as in Bollen and Whaley (2004) ), and with positive open interest. Moneyness of the option, "money," is computed as stock price over strike price. If it is close to 1, then it is at-the-money.
We require options to have moneyness between 0.95 and 1.05 to be at-the-money.
In Table 1 , we present summary statistics for the stocks and options included in our sample. Panel A reports firm-level characteristics: market capitalization, book-to-market ratio computed as the ratio of book value of equity over market value of equity, past 12-month stock return, past 3-month daily stock return volatility, skewness and kurtosis. These firm characteristics are observed at the end of December, March, June and October and are merged with options returns on earnings announcement events in the four quarters of each year.
We provide the number of observations, mean, median and standard deviation for each of the firm characteristic variables. The summary statistics are computed by pooling over all firms and all quarters. In total, our sample includes more than 30,000 firm-quarter observations. For each quarter, the number of sample firms ranges between 200 and 1100, which shows that our sample covers a good size of the cross-section of stocks. The median market cap in our sample is about $2.0 billion. Over the same time period, the median market cap for NYSE firms is $ 1.3
2 Arbitrary boundaries include: bid>0, bid<offer; for put options we require strike >= bid and offer >= max(0, strike price-stock price); for call option we require stock price >=bid and offer >= max(0, stock price-strike price).
billion. So our sample firms are larger than a typical NYSE firms. For book-to-market ratios, the median of our sample is 0.343. During the same period, the median book-to-market ration for NYSE firms is 0.576. This indicates our sample include more value firms than growth firms when compared to the NYSE firms. The mean stock return over the past 12 months is 10.2%, similar to the US stock market risk premium. The mean stock return volatility is 46.2%, which is lower than an average NYSE firm's volatility of about 55%. Means of skewness and kurtosis are 0.056 and 5.434, respectively. Overall, our sample firms are larger-than-average firms with lower-than-average book-to-market ratios. This is consistent with our knowledge that option listing is more prevalent for larger firms.
Panel B reports summary statistics for individual options. The mean and median of moneyness is 1.014 and 1.010, respectively, indicating that most of the sample options are fairly close to at-the-money. Days to maturity are on average about 38 days, so our sample options are short-term options. In terms of liquidity, open interest is on average 2,318, and daily volume is 386. Implied volatility is on average 50.7%, which is higher than past realized volatility of 46.2%. The fact that implied volatility is higher than historical volatility is expected, because implied volatility contains a component of the volatility risk premium. Overall, we are confident that our sample includes only close to maturity, at-the-money options with reasonable trading activities.
Straddle Returns
We consider two ways to construct straddles: the simple straddle and the delta-neutral straddle. For the simple straddle, the investor purchases a pair of call and put options with matching strike prices and maturity dates. The idea of delta-neutral straddle is discussed in Coval and Shumway (2001) . Option delta measures the option price's sensitivity to the underlying price movements. When we pair the puts and calls, the weights are adjusted to make the straddle delta to be zero. By doing so, the straddle becomes delta-neutral, and theoretically has no exposure to price changes in the underlying. Whenever there is more than one pair of delta-neutral straddles on the same stock on the same day, we either equal weight or volume weight individual straddles. 3 Results obtained using simple straddles and delta-neutral straddles are quantitatively very similar, and we choose to report only delta-neutral straddle results.
The expected returns on a straddle depend on its exposure to market return, volatility risk and jump risk. Since delta-neutral straddles have zero exposure to the underlying asset, they presumably have little to no exposure to the market return. 4 To control for exposure to market volatility risk and market jump risk, Cremers et al (2012) construct delta-neutral, vega-neutral and gamma-neutral index straddles by using index options with different maturity dates.
However, since individual stock options tend to be much less actively traded than index options and our sample is restricted to short-term options, it is difficult to construct reasonably liquid straddles that are simultaneously vega-, gamma-, and delta-neutral. 5 Therefore, we choose to focus on delta-neutral straddles, rather than vega-or gamma-neutral. Meanwhile, both volatility premium and jump premium are found to be negative in the literature, and straddles in general have positive exposures to both volatility risk and jump risk. Following this reasoning, not adjusting for any volatility risk premium or jump risk premium would understate the returns on straddles, which biases against our findings of positive straddle returns.
3 From results not shown, we also compute open-interest weighted returns, and results are very similar. 4 From results not reported, we also construct beta-neutral straddles to have zero exposure to market risk, and the results are quite similar to delta-neutral straddles. 5 Alternatively, we can estimate individual straddles' exposures to market volatility and jump risk around earnings announcements. But given our short holding period for each straddle, the estimation is infeasible.
In section 3.1, we examine straddles formed over all days and use them as benchmark.
Then we focus on straddles formed around earnings announcement days in section 3.2. In section 3.3, we provide several alternative interpretations for straddle returns around earnings announcement days.
Straddle Returns at Stock Level
We examine daily, weekly and monthly straddle returns over all trading days from 1996 to 2010. For daily straddle returns, we construct the straddle based on the midpoint of previous day closing ask and bid prices to identify the at-the-money options, and compute the straddle return over the next day using the midpoints. The holding period of the at-the-money daily straddle is only one day. For weekly straddle returns, we hold the straddle for five business days from Tuesday to the next Tuesday. We construct monthly straddles from month end to the next month end. The average straddle returns are reported in Panel A of The strong negative returns associated with straddles are not surprising given the findings in Coval and Shumway (2001) , and Cremers et al (2012) . Meanwhile, Bollen and Whaley (2004) shows that on average straddles lose money, about 3% per week, which is comparable with our finding in terms of magnitude.
Straddle Returns around Earnings Announcements
In this section, we focus on straddle returns around earnings announcements. Following previous studies such as Chae (2005) and Sarkar and Schwartz (2009), we assume that earnings announcements are scheduled events and the timing of the events are public information. In particular, Chae (2005) studies the relationship between trading volume and information asymmetry around scheduled events vs. unscheduled announcements. Given that the literature has treated the earnings announcements as scheduled events, we consider it to be implausible that any abnormal straddle returns around earnings announcement is driven by earnings announcement dates not being publicly available to investors.
We start by examining the dynamics of uncertainty around earnings announcements, measured by implied volatilities. We average implied volatilities of firm level at-the-money calls and puts for each trading day from 20 days before earnings announcement to 20 days after the earnings announcement. We obtain the earnings announcement dates from IBES. We define day 0 as the event day, during which earnings is announced. The trading day before announcement is day -1, and the trading day after announcement is day 1. One complication in the real world is that some announcements are made before trading hours while others are after trading hours.
Previous studies show that data on exact announcement hours can be imprecise; therefore we choose to only make use of announcement date and do not adjust for announcement hours.
Figure 1 plots mean implied volatility over the horizon [-20, 20] , i.e., from 20 days before announcements until 20 days after. Starting from day -20, the mean implied volatility is 0.493, and it gradually increases to 0.520 on day -4. Between day -4 and day -1, the slope for implied volatility becomes steeper and the implied volatility increases to 0.532 on day -1, which is the highest point in the graph. On day 0, the average stays around 0.524, which is still relatively high.
On day 1, the implied volatility crashes down to 0.491. This pattern suggests that the uncertainty regarding the news released in earnings announcements is generally resolved around day 0. Over the next 20 days, the implied volatility remains mostly flat. For day 20, the implied volatility becomes 0.482, which is slightly lower than implied volatility on day -20. The implied volatility generally stays low until the next earnings announcement, unless some other important events happen unexpectedly. The dynamics of implied volatility around earnings announcements clearly shows that implied volatility gradually runs up before earnings announcements, stays at the peak for one day, then drops to normal level.
We construct straddles over different windows around earnings announcements. Our goal is to use straddles to study uncertainty dynamics around earnings announcement days, so we choose to focus on strategies that cover the complete event periods. In another word, our straddles are held till the uncertainty is fully or partially resolved. To be specific, the starting dates of the straddles are chosen among -5, -3 and -1, and the ending dates are either 0 or 1. 7 For instance, for the strategy over [-5, 0] , we buy the straddle on day -5, and sell the straddle on earnings announcement day, and the holding period for this straddle is 5 days. The longest holding period is 6 trading days for strategy [-5, 1] , and the shortest holding period is 1 trading day for strategy [-1, 0] . After uncertainty is resolved, it is usually the case that one of the options (put or call) ends up being in the money, and becomes much more expensive than before the announcements, which provides positive gain.
In Panel B of Table 2 , we report average short-term at-the-money delta-neutral straddle returns. To be comparable across different holding windows, we report the holding period returns as well as daily returns. For each strategy, we pool across all stocks over all quarters to compute the mean and the t-statistics. The first three strategies are [-5,0] , [-3,0] and [-1,0] , all of which involve selling at the end of the earnings announcement day. Panel B of Table 2 includes results for both equal weighting and volume weighting. We first look at the equal weighting results. Straddle holding period returns over [-5, 0] , [-3, 0] and [-1, 0] are 2.22%, 3.00% and 2.30%, which is equivalent to daily return of 0.44%, 1.00% and 2.30%. All returns have tstatistics higher than 15. It is interesting that the daily returns on straddles become higher as the holding period gets shorter. Next, we consider three strategies where straddles are held until day 1, and they are [-5,1] , [-3,1] and [-1,1]. Berkman and Truong (2008) have found that more than 30% of firms announce their earnings after the market close during the period from 1995 to 1999.
Thus, holding the straddles until one day after the earnings announcement dates guarantees that all the uncertainties associated with the earnings release are resolved. The average holding straddle returns for [-5,1] , [-3,1] and [-1,1] are 2.68%, 1.25% and 3.09%, respectively, and they remain highly significant.
When we switch to the volume-weighted returns in the right half of the panel, all straddle returns are still positive and significant with similar magnitudes. To ensure that the positive straddle returns are not driven by how we construct straddles, we conduct additional robustness checks on simple straddle returns. From results not reported, with different combinations of holding periods and weighting schemes, the simple straddle returns are between 0.80% and 2.25%, and they all have t-statistics above 6.0.
Are the average positive returns on straddles driven by a special time period or outliers in the data? To answer this question, Figure 2 plots the time-series of returns for both delta-neutral straddles and simple straddles using the [-3,0] window over the past 15 years. We choose the strategy [-3,0] because it has a medium holding length. It is evident from the plot that most of the time, the delta-neutral straddle returns are close to 1% per day, except for 7 out of 60 quarters.
The pattern for simple straddle returns is quite similar, which implies that the significant positive returns are not driven by any particular period. Meanwhile, we notice interesting time variation patterns in the straddle returns. For instance, straddle returns are relatively lower around 2001
and 2008, which coincides with market downturns 8 .
To summarize the empirical findings in this section, we document significantly positive straddle returns around earnings announcements, and this finding is robust over time and using different ways of constructing straddle returns.
8 From results not reported, we examine whether straddle returns is correlated with level of VIX. We find that when VIX is high, the straddle returns would be low afterwards. It is possible that during a time of high uncertainty, investors would like to buy straddles to protect against high uncertainty, and this action pushes up the purchase price for straddles, which leads to lower returns on straddles.
Why Positive Straddle Returns around Earnings Announcements?
The finding of positive straddle returns around earnings announcement days is in sharp contrast with the negative average straddle returns computed over all trading days. The average negative straddle returns over all trading days are well expected, given that straddles have positive exposure to volatility risk and jump risk, which are both negatively priced. The positive straddle returns around earnings announcement days are puzzling, which are at odds with negatively priced volatility risk and jump risk. Based on above reasoning, we first rule out the risk story as the reason for positive straddle returns around earnings announcements.
Prior to earnings announcements, as investors start to notice the upcoming earnings announcements, the implied volatility should increase, reflecting the high uncertainty associated with earnings announcement. If option market has rational expectation of the uncertainty around earnings announcement, then buying delta-neutral straddle right before earnings announcement should not deliver any abnormal returns. The positive straddles returns imply that the straddle prices before earnings announcement are too low. In another word, from option prices, there is substantial underestimation of uncertainty before earnings announcements.
We propose three non-risk explanations for the underestimation of uncertainty. The first explanation is behavioral. Maybe the options investors on average underestimate the magnitude of uncertainty around earnings announcements due to a behavioral bias, "conservatism,"
meaning that investors are too slow to draw inferences from data and that leads to investors' under-reaction towards information in the data. In our setting, even though it is well-known that stock price uncertainty peaks around earnings announcements, investors still fail to fully anticipate the magnitude of the uncertainty. Thus, the underestimation of uncertainty generates positive returns on straddles around earnings announcements.
Our second explanation is related to rational investors' preference over ambiguity.
Possibly some investors are ambiguity averse, and they dislike the ambiguity associated with earnings announcement. The ambiguity aversion might cause these investors to stay away from options with upcoming earnings announcements, a similar effect like portfolio inertia, as discussed in Illeditsch (2011). A natural consequence of portfolio inertia is that prices fail to fully incorporate investors' expectation of uncertainty, which leads to abnormal straddle returns.
Our last alternative is about costs related to acquiring information to from correct expectation about uncertainty. Suppose investors don't have behavioral biases like conservatism, and they don't have aversion towards ambiguity. However, if it is too costly to acquire information to form the "correct" expectation of uncertainty, or it is too costly to trade on the information, then the price of options still wouldn't precisely incorporate the otherwise "correct" expectation of uncertainty, which possibly leads to abnormal returns in straddles.
The three alternative interpretations are not exclusive from each other, and it might well be the case that some or all of them are the drivers for the positive straddle returns around earnings announcements.
Straddle Returns in the Cross-section
We examine the cross-sectional patterns of straddle returns in this section, which serves three purposes. First, it allows us to examine whether the positive straddle returns documented in the previous section are robust across different firm and option characteristics. Second, we investigate whether characteristics of options or stocks help to predict patterns in straddle returns around earnings announcements. Finally, the cross-sectional results might shed light on how our findings are related to conservatism bias, ambiguity aversion and market inefficiency.
In the previous section, we construct straddles over various windows around earnings announcements, and the results are qualitatively similar. For brevity, in this section we focus on delta-neutral straddles over the window of [-3,0] , meaning we long straddles 3 days before the earning announcement and sell them at the close on earnings announcement days, which results in a 3-day holding period. Our results are quantitatively similar using alternative windows and they are available upon request.
Section 4.1 and 4.2 examine straddle returns with different option and stock characteristics, respectively. In section 4.3, we estimate predictive Fama-MacBeth regressions for straddle returns.
Straddle Returns across Option Characteristics
The most important features for options are whether it is a call or a put, its moneyness, its time to maturity and its implied volatility. Since we only consider at-the-money straddles in this paper, we leave out moneyness and focus on the three other features. In the interest of predicting straddle returns, all features should be available to investors when constructing straddles. For options, both maturity and whether the option is a call or put are public information. The implied volatility can also be computed when constructing straddles. To compute straddle returns along different option characteristics, we first group options each quarter by days to maturity, historical implied volatilities, and by whether they are puts or calls. Next, we compute the cross-sectional average straddle returns for each option characteristic category for each quarter. The final means and t-statistics are computed over the 60 quarters of option returns over different option characteristics.
The results are presented in Table 3 . For mean straddle returns, we report the 3-day holding return and the t-statistics. We omit the daily returns, because all returns in this table are over 3 days and thus are readily comparable. In Panel A, we compare returns on calls with returns on puts. If we use equal weighting, the average 3-day holding return for call is 8.18%, and for put, it is -1.88%. The difference between call return and put return becomes 10.06%. All three numbers are statistically significant, especially for the call returns and the difference between the call and put returns. The magnitudes of returns are quantitatively similar when we use volume weighting. Previous literature on the earnings premium documents that the average stock return over earnings announcements is positive, meaning that the stock prices, on average, would increase over the earnings announcement period 9 . Given it is more likely to observe positive earnings shocks than negative earnings shocks, it is not surprising to observe calls making positive returns and puts making negative returns over earnings announcement periods.
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The next option characteristic we examine is time to maturity. For options with shorter time to maturity, the sensitivity to volatility changes (measured by vega) is higher. All else equal, underestimation of uncertainty would presumably impact shorter-term straddles harder, which 9 One possible reason, supported by evidence in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) , is that managers manage reported earnings to avoid earnings decreases and losses. 10 Skinner (1994) presents some evidence that firms with negative news tend to announce earnings early with a sample much earlier than ours. When firms make earnings announcement earlier than they are scheduled, then the pre-announced earnings become surprise to investors which lead to sharp changes in stock prices. And this could drive our results. However, the results presented in Panel A of Table 3 indicates that this is not the case. If our results are driven by firms with negative news announcing earnings early, then we should see positive straddle returns mostly coming from the put option and not the call options. Table 3 Panel A shows the positive straddle returns are dominantly driven by the positive call option returns and not the put option returns.
indicates that shorter-term straddles might have higher returns. Meanwhile, Stein (1989) finds there is over-reaction in the long-term implied volatility on S&P 100 index as it moves by same amount as the short-term implied volatility. In Panel B, we separate firm level straddle returns into four groups based on days to maturity. For the low group, the average number for days to maturity is 24 days, while the average number of days to maturity for the high group is 53 days.
For equal weighting, straddles with the shortest and longest time to maturity have average holding period returns of 3.51% and 3.01%, respectively. The difference between the longest and shortest time to maturity straddles is not significant, possibly because we only include relatively short term options, and there is no real long term options in our sample.
The level of implied volatility is one of the most important characteristics for options.
Next, we sort all straddles into four groups based on implied volatilities computed as an average of implied volatility from call and put in Panel C. Using equal weighting, the average straddle returns for firms with the lowest implied volatilities is 3.65%, while average straddle returns for firms with the highest implied volatilities is 1.90%. The difference between the two is 1.75%, and is significant with a t-statistic of 4.52. Volume weighting delivers very similar results. The results show that a low level of implied volatility is associated with more positive straddle returns during earnings announcement periods.
To summarize, we find large positive returns on call options and negative returns on put options around earnings announcements. This is strong evidence against the possibility that our results are driven by firms with bad news pre-announcing their earnings. For straddles with different time to maturity and historical implied volatility, straddles with shorter horizon and lower implied volatility tend to have higher returns. Overall, average straddle returns stay significantly positive across all option characteristics, confirming the robustness of our finding in previous section 11 .
Straddle Returns across Different Stock Characteristics
In this section, we investigate whether straddle returns around earnings announcements follow any patterns across observable stock-level characteristics. We focus our discussion on the In earlier discussion, we mention three possible explanations for positive straddle returns:
conservatism, ambiguity aversion and information cost. All three alternatives can be consistent with our prior on how information environment and noisy signals affect underestimation of uncertainty. According to Hilbert (2012) , when the underlying process contains more noise, it would result in more severe behavioral bias, such as "conservatism". Meanwhile, investors with ambiguity-aversion preferences would presumably avoid firms with more noises. Finally, the 11 From results not reported, we also investigate sorting based on put-call volume ratio, as in Pan and Poteshman (2006) , and implied volatility difference between call and put options, as in Xing, Zhang and Zhao (2010) . The average straddle returns are significantly positive across straddles with different put-call ratios and different volatility skew measures. Meanwhile, there is no uniform pattern across different put-call ratio/volatility skew groups.
information cost could be higher for firms with less transparent information environment, or first with more noise in the signals.
We group "relevant" stock-level information into four different groups: the first group is industries; the second group includes the standard firm characteristics that have been shown to be related to equity returns such as size, book-to-market ratio, past stock returns and difference between implied volatility and historical volatility; the third group includes higher moments and jumps in the historical return process, and the last group includes historical earnings surprises.
To examine patterns in the cross-section, we follow a similar portfolio sorting procedure as in section 4.1. For every quarter, we sort all firms into 4 groups, based on stock characteristics observed at the end of the previous quarter, and we average firm level straddle returns for each of the four groups. The means and t-statistics for each group are computed over 60 quarters for each of the four groups. We focus on the window of [-3,0] , and we present 3-day holding period returns and t-statistics on delta-neutral straddles. To be conservative, we use volume weighting at firm level whenever there are more than one at-the-money straddles 12 . Table 4 reports the results.
We start the discussion with analysis of straddle returns on firms from different industries in Panel A of Table 4 . The 12-industry classification scheme is obtained from Ken French's website. In general, people are more familiar with well-established industries and can more precisely predict future performances in those industries. In contrast, people are less familiar with new industries, and thus have more difficulty with processing information and forming predictions about those firms' future performances. Among the 12 industries, the highest straddle return is achieved at 4.74% for "business equipment" industry, and the lowest straddle return is -0.71% for the "utilities" industry. Out of 12 industries, except for the "utilities" and "energy" industries, 10 industries obtain significant and positive straddle returns around earnings announcement periods. Both the "utilities" and "energy" industries in the U.S. have historically been highly regulated, and they slowly underwent deregulation process during our sample period.
It might not be that surprising that earnings announcements have minimal impact on their stock prices and option prices, given that there usually were not big earnings surprises for the above two industries. For "business equipment" and "telecom" industry, they are the relative new industries and there is comparatively more difficult (or more ambiguity) to estimate cash flows.
Panel B reports results based on sorts on four firm characteristics that have been shown in previous literature to be significantly related to stock returns (or option returns). The first three are the most well-known firm level characteristics: size, book-to-market ratio and past 3-month return. Ex ante, one might expect that it is harder to estimate uncertainty associated with earning for small firms and growth firms (firms with low book-to-market ratio). The reason is the following: for smaller firms, there is less analyst coverage and more information asymmetry, and thus it might be more difficult to correctly forecast the changes in uncertainty surrounding earnings announcements. For growth firms, they have more growth options and less assets-inplace than value firms, and more volatile earnings in general, it might be more difficult to estimate uncertainty for growth firms than for value firms. For size groups, the average straddle return is 4.10% and 1.71% for firms in the smallest and the largest size quartile, respectively, and the difference is significant with a t-statistics of 3.74. For value effect, the average straddle return is 3.17% and 3.11% for firms in the lowest and the highest book-to-market ratio quartile, respectively. But the difference is insignificant. For momentum effect, the average straddle return is 3.16% and 3.47% for firms in the lowest and the highest past return quartile, respectively. The difference in straddle returns between the loser and winner portfolios is not statistically significant.
The last variable is the difference between historical volatility and implied volatility, which is introduced in Goyal and Saretto (2009) . The main idea is that investors tend to be slow to adjust their expectations towards implied volatility in general, and the difference between historical volatility and implied volatility can affect straddle returns on average. They find that the larger the difference between historical volatility and implied volatility, the higher the straddle returns. From our results, the average straddle returns around earnings announcements for the highest and the lowest difference between historical volatility and implied volatility are 3.87% and 1.80%, respectively. The difference between the two is 2.07% with a significant tstatistic of 4.18. This finding strongly supports the argument in Goyal and Saretto (2009) , and also indicates that the under-reaction to volatility is also relevant for earnings announcement period.
The results in Panel B clearly show the positive straddle returns around earnings announcement are robust across all characteristic groups in consideration. Only size and the difference between historical volatility and implied volatility make a difference for crosssectional straddle returns around earnings announcements.
Next, we turn our focus to variables that are more directly related to measures of noise in the stock return process and earnings process. For the stock return process, we compute historical higher moments: variance, skewness and kurtosis using past three months daily return data. We also compute historical jump frequency and historical jump size. We follow the Lee and Mykland (2008) procedure and use one year of daily returns data to extract the jump process for each firm in our sample. 13 Presumably, it is more difficult for investors to make precise estimates of uncertainty around earnings announcements for firms with larger higher moments, more frequent jumps, or larger jumps. Therefore, we expect that firms with larger high moments and larger jumps to have higher positive straddle returns around earnings announcements.
The results are presented in Panel C of Table 4 . For firms with the lowest and highest historical volatility, the straddle returns are 2.70% and 3.66%, respectively. For firms with the lowest and highest historical skewness, the straddle returns are 2.40% and 2.69%, respectively.
For firms with the lowest and highest historical kurtosis, the straddle returns are 2.36% and 4.17%, respectively. Evidently, larger historical moments do increase the difficulty of correctly estimating uncertainty around earnings announcements. Out of the three moments, the difference between the high and low is significant for both volatility and kurtosis. For the jump frequency measure, firms with the lowest and highest jump frequency have average straddle returns of 2.21% and 4.43%, respectively. The difference is 2.12%, with a t-statistic of 4.46. For the jump size measure, firms with the smallest and largest jump size have average straddle returns of 3.09% and 3.77%, respectively. However, the difference is smaller than in the case of jump frequency, and it is not statistically significant. The conclusion from using jump measures is similar to that of historical higher moments: higher jump frequency and larger jump size increase the difficulty of correctly estimating uncertainty around earnings announcements.
14 Since our straddles are constructed during earnings announcement periods, an interesting question is whether investors learn from past earnings surprises about the size of uncertainty and 13 Our results remains the same when we use past 2-year daily return data to compute jump frequency and jump size. 14 For results not reported, we separate jumps into positive jumps and negative jumps. Both positive jump frequency and negative jump frequency affect straddles returns in similar ways as the jump frequency overall. For positive jump size and negative jump sizes, we find more significance for negative jumps sizes. make correct inferences afterwards. Obviously, this depends on the precision of the signal received from previous earnings announcements. If the information from previous earnings announcements contains more noise than signal, then it would be more difficult to form correct estimation on the magnitude of uncertainty. In other words, the question we examine in Panel D is whether underestimation of uncertainty is more pronounced for firms with bigger and noisier earnings in the past.
We start by considering the number of analysts as a proxy for the overall quality of the information environment, assuming that firms with more analysts following tend to have more transparent information environments. We obtain the number of analysts following each firm from IBES. The average straddle returns for firms with the lowest and highest number of analysts are 4.23% and 2.44%, respectively. The difference between the two groups is 1.78%
with a significant t-statistic of -3.25. This supports the notion that the better information environment, the less options investors underestimate uncertainty around earnings announcements.
15
There are many ways to measure earnings surprises. One conventional measure is the standardized difference between the announced earnings and the analyst forecast consensus, which is our main "SUE" measure. 16 A more direct surprise measure for investors is the cumulative return over the earnings announcement period, because the return only responds to "true surprises." Therefore, we compute cumulated abnormal return, "CAR", over [-1,1] after 15 From unreported results, we also examine how institutional ownership affects straddle returns. We find straddle returns across different levels of institutional ownership are always positive and significant. But there doesn't exist a clear cross-sectional pattern. 16 From results not reported, we also compute earnings surprises using random walk model and seasonality model. The results are quite similar to those using consensus forecast.
adjusting for market return over the same period. For historical uncertainty in earnings surprises, we compute the variance of "SUE" and "CAR", using the previous 8 quarters.
For firms with the lowest and highest EA surprise, the average straddle returns are 3.41% and 3.60%, respectively. The difference is positive but not significant. For firms with the lowest and highest CAR over earnings announcements, the average straddle returns are 2.75% and 4.42%, respectively. The difference is 1.68% with a significant t-statistic of 3.86. The above patterns support the hypothesis that bigger historical surprises mean more under-adjustments to uncertainty. Next we turn to the variance measure of earnings surprises. For firms with the lowest and highest variance of EA surprises, the average straddle returns are 2.39% and 3.55%, respectively. The difference is 1.15% with a marginally significant t-statistic of 1.94. For firms with the lowest and highest variance of CAR, the average straddle returns are 1.83% and 4.93%, respectively. The difference is 3.10% with a marginally significant t-statistic of 6.10.
In a nutshell, this section presents strong evidence that short-term at-the-money straddles have positive and significant results across firms with many different characteristics. In particular, we find firms with less transparent information environments and with more noise in the past returns and earnings processes are more likely to produce higher straddle returns around earnings announcement.
Fama-MacBeth Regression
In previous sections, we compute average straddle returns at the portfolio level. We find all average straddle returns are positive and significant, and firm characteristics on higher moments, jump processes and historical earnings shocks are related to the magnitude of underestimation in the cross-section. In this section, we use the Fama-MacBeth regression approach to directly examine whether individual straddle returns can be predicted by past information and to determine which of the past information has the strongest predictive power.
In particular, for each quarter, we estimate a cross-sectional regression for individual straddle returns. Then, we average all quarterly coefficients over 60 quarters to obtain the mean coefficient estimates and conduct inferences.
We estimate four FM regressions. In the first regression, we include the following stocklevel characteristics: size, book-to-market ratio, past returns and the difference between historical volatility and implied volatility. In the second regression, we only include historical higher moments and historical jump frequency and jump size. In the third regression, we only include measures related to earnings: number of analysts covering each firm, past earnings surprises, and the variance of past earnings surprises. The above three regressions help to understand whether each category of information is relevant for the straddle returns. In the last regression, we include all information used in the previous three regressions in order to find out which variables have the strongest predictive power.
As in previous sections, we only report results for delta-neutral straddles, holding over [-3,0] . Results on different windows are both qualitatively and quantitatively similar and are available upon request. To normalize the variables, we take logs of size, book-to-market ratio, historical volatility and kurtosis. There are 14 variables in total, and multi-collinearity becomes a natural concern. Before we estimate the regressions, we compute correlation coefficients to filter out high-correlation pairs. There are two correlations higher than 60%, and those are between historical volatility and historical skewness, and between SUE and variance of SUE. We choose to keep skewness and variance of SUE, and discard volatility and SUE. In all regressions, we control for option-level information, such as time to maturity and moneyness.
Regression results are reported in Table 5 . In the first regression, coefficients on size and book-to-market ratio are both negative and significant, while past 3-month return is positive and significant. These results confirm previous findings that the positive straddle returns are larger for smaller firms and growth firms. The positive significance on the past returns might result from the under-reaction to winners' positive returns. The under-reaction bias as in Goyal and Saretto (2009) is significantly positive, which indicates the underestimation of uncertainty carries over from the overall difference between historical volatility and implied volatility, and when the difference between the two is greater, possibly the underestimation of uncertainty during earnings announcement periods increases, leading to higher straddle returns. The adjusted R2 for the first regression is 1.97%.
Next we examine historical higher moments and historical jump statistics. As expected, higher historical moments and higher jump statistics all carry positive signs, indicating that the positive straddle returns are larger for firms with more noise in their returns. The only significant coefficient in this regression is jump frequency, which dominates all other higher moments and jump size. The adjusted R2 is 0.89%, substantially lower than the first regression.
The third regression only includes information on earnings. The coefficient on the number of analysts is significantly negative, which suggests that when there are fewer analysts following the firm, the straddle returns around earnings announcements become larger. We find both CAR and variance of CAR carry positive and significant coefficients, indicating that straddle returns are larger for firms with bigger and more fluctuations in their past earnings announcements. In the presence of CAR and variance of CAR, the variance of earnings surprise, measured as difference between announced earnings and forecast consensus, becomes insignificant. The adjusted R2 now is 1.14%, slightly higher than the second regression.
The last regression combines all variables. Firm size, book-to-market ratio, the underreaction proxy from Goyal and Saretto (2009) , number of analysts, CAR and variance of CAR are all significant with expected signs, while most of the historical jump frequency becomes insignificant. Now the adjusted R2 becomes 3.61%, indicating the characteristics in the first regression contributing the most to the predictive regression.
To summarize the findings in this section, size, book-to-market ratio, difference between historical volatility and implied volatility, number of analysts, CAR and variance of CAR all help to predict straddle returns around earnings announcement days.
In the Existence of Transaction Cost
Historically, transaction costs in individual stock options market are notoriously high, partially to compensate the options market makers for providing liquidity. Now in anticipation of rising uncertainty around earnings announcement and in anticipation of possibly more informed trading around this period, would the transaction cost be higher to the point that eliminate the positive straddle returns? Even though we would like to emphasize that our main focus of this paper is to document investors' anticipation of uncertainty around earnings announcements rather than to search for a profitable trading strategy, it would be interesting to know whether straddles around earnings announcement days can survive the high transaction costs in options market. If they can, it would be a perfect robustness check; if they can't, it would be clear evidence for limit of arbitrage in options market.
Before we discuss any results, first we have to acknowledge the limitations of our data for transaction costs. In previous sections, our results are based on returns computed using the mid-point prices of bids and offers as a reference. We believe that the mid-points fairly reflect market perception of real prices on average, so the findings in previous section are not systematically biased. However, the mid-quote prices might not be the best measure for transaction prices for two reasons. First, the quotes at end of the day could be stale and might not reflect real trading prices during the day. Second, a substantial amount of trades happen within quotes, meaning that using quoted prices might over-estimate the real transaction costs.
Unfortunately, the real transaction prices are not available in our dataset, and we would use quoted prices as proxies for trading prices with adjustments. According to De Fontnouvelle et al (2003) and Mayhew (2002) , effective spreads for equity options are large in absolute terms but small relative to the quoted spreads. Typically, the ratio of effective to quoted spread is less than 0.5. On the other hand, Battalio et al (2004) study a period around the year 2000, and find that for a small sample of large stocks, the ratio of effective spread to quoted spread can be between 0.8 and 1. To cope with the within quotes problem, we focus on two cases by assuming the realized spread is either 50% or 100% of the quoted spread 17 . Our assumption for transaction costs is very conservative, given that transaction costs for options over recent years can be as low as 1-2 cents.
From unreported results, the median relative closing bid-ask spread is on average about 10%, and it increases to around 12% around earnings announcement days, which confirms that transaction costs overall are high in options market and they increase even more around event days. Given the high transaction cost, investors need to modify their strategy to survive these transaction costs. There are two approaches to reduce the transaction costs. First, for a [-3,0] strategy, the investor is supposed to first buy, and then sell, which doubles the cost of a buy and hold strategy. An investor can easily cut the trading costs in half by using a buy and hold to maturity strategy. Second, since bid-ask spread tend to be persistent at firm level, investors can possibly limit their investments to those with lower historical transaction costs.
Next we focus on a buy and hold strategy similar to Goyal and Saretto (2009) . We buy the straddle 3 days before earnings announcement, and hold it until option's first maturity after earnings announcement rather than selling the straddle on earnings announcement day. To be more specific, we use the case where we assume realized spread is the same as the quoted spread as an example. That is, we buy both call and put options on day -3 at the closing ask price and hold the straddle until maturity. On maturity, the return on straddle is realized as follows: if the option is in the money, we use the in the money amount; if the option is out of the money, then the payoff is zero. Would this buy and hold strategy still catch anticipated increase in uncertainty around earnings announcement? As long as the straddle is constructed before the earnings announcement, and it expires after the earnings announcement, the anticipated increase in uncertainty would increase returns on the straddle, because options are forward-looking until the maturity date. The only concern here is that when the maturity date goes further away from the earnings announcement day, the anticipated increase in uncertainty might be averaged over a longer horizon and becomes insignificant. Therefore, we expect the above buy and hold strategy to achieve the highest return for options with shorter times to maturity. Similarly, we expect the buy and hold strategy would deliver better returns for options with lower historical transaction costs.
We present the results of holding straddles from day -3 to options' maturity in Table 6 . In How firms choose their earnings announcement dates is beyond the scope of this paper. As mentioned in the introduction, firms tend to choose their earnings announcement date to be consistent with the previous year's announcement date, and it is public information long before the actual announcement. In terms of whether particular firms prefer or avoid option expiration dates, there is no perceivable pattern, so we assume the days between announcement date and option expiration date are exogenously determined.
In Panel A of Table 6 , for our hypothetical case of the effective spread being 50% of the quoted spread, the first groups of straddles, with 4 to 10 days to expiration, have daily return of 1.64% with a t-statistic of 5.14. If the holding period is 4 days, the cumulative return becomes 7%. When the straddle forming dates are between 11 and 20 days away from expiration dates, the average daily straddle return reduces to 0.15% with a marginally significant t-statistic of 1.64.
For the last two groups with longer time to maturity, average straddle returns turn to significantly negative numbers. For the hypothetical case of the effective spread being the same as the quoted spread, for the shortest time to maturity group, the average daily straddle return is 0.61% with a significant t-statistic of 2.08, while all other three groups have significantly negative straddle returns. This result confirms our prior that, to overcome transaction costs, one needs to focus on short-term straddles.
The last two lines separate all straddles based on historical bid-ask spread into "low" and "high" groups based on the median bid-ask spread. If the effective spread is only 50% of the quoted spread, both groups have positive and significant straddle returns. If effective spread is 100% of the quoted spread, only the straddles with lower-than-median transaction costs can deliver average positive returns. This result suggests that historical bid-ask spread can be used to help constructing profitable options trading strategies around earnings announcements.
In Panel B, we only include options with 4-10 days until maturity and examine whether stock level characteristics still help to predict straddle returns. The short answer is yes. Overall, straddles all deliver positive daily average returns over this short period, for both cases with effective spreads being 50% or 100% quoted spreads. Higher and more significant straddle returns are achieved by smaller firms, firms with higher historical volatility and skewness, more under-reaction bias as in Goyal and Saretto (2009) , larger jump size, larger earnings surprises and more volatile CAR over earnings announcement periods. This is consistent with our finding in section 4.
The empirical evidence in this section shows that even though the transaction costs at stock option level is extremely high, a subset of straddles with short time to maturity can still deliver significant positive returns around earnings announcements when 50% or even 100% quoted spreads are considered as effective spreads. This suggests that the positive straddle returns around earnings announcements are not merely an artifact resulting from high bid-ask spread.
Conclusion
How investors form their expectations of uncertainty has been one of the central themes in academic research in the finance area. In this paper, we use firm earnings announcements as a special event to study investors' perceptions of firms' fundamental uncertainty. We construct delta-neutral straddles five days, three days and one day prior to scheduled earnings announcement dates and hold the straddles until the day of or one day after the earnings announcement dates. The straddle returns around earnings announcements are significantly positive, which is in stark contrast with the significantly negative straddle returns on individual stocks during normal periods. We also find that the positive straddle returns around earnings announcements is higher for smaller firms, firms with less analyst coverage, firms with higher past return volatilities, firms with higher past jump intensities, firms with higher past earnings surprises, and firms with larger variance in historical earnings surprises.
Positive straddle returns are inconsistent with a risk-based explanation, because straddles are mostly positively exposed to volatility risk and jump risk, which are both negatively priced.
From the cross-sectional evidence, the positive straddle returns are stronger for firms with less transparent information environment or noisier signals. That is, when it is more difficult or costly to acquire and process information about the firm, there is more underestimation of uncertainty, which leads to higher positive straddle returns. This finding is consistent with a conservatism behavioral bias, an ambiguity-aversion preference, and high information cost or high trading cost.
We include option trading costs directly in the last robustness check, and find short-term straddle returns can survive the high trading cost, indicating that high transaction cost or limits to arbitrage is not the whole story. Table 3 . Delta-neutral Straddle over [-3,0] across different option characteristics Our sample is from January 1996 to December 2010. Data on options are from Option Metrics. Delta-neutral straddles are constructed over [-3,0] , relative to earnings announcement days, where day 0 is the earnings announcement day. In the case when one stock has more than one pair of short term at-the-money straddles, we adopt either equal weighting or volume weighting.
To compute means and t-stats for straddle returns, each quarter, we first group options by whether they are puts or calls, days to maturity and implied volatilities. Next, we compute the cross-sectional average straddle returns for each option characteristic category for each quarter.
The final means and t-statistics are computed over the time-series of option returns over different option characteristics. Table 4 . Sorting straddles by underlying stock characteristics [-3,0] Our sample is from January 1996 to December 2010. Data on options are from Option Metrics. Straddles are computed over [-3,0] , relative to earnings announcement days, where day 0 is the earnings announcement day. In the case when one stock has more than one pair of short term at-the-money straddles, we adopt volume weighting. Each quarter, we sort all firms into 4 groups based on previous period stock characteristics, and we average firm-level straddle returns for each of the four groups. The means and t-statistics for each group are computed over 60 quarters for each of the four groups. In Panel C, historical moments are computed over past 3 months of daily returns, and historical jump statistics are computed over the past 12 months of daily returns. Table 6 . Holding the option from 3 days before EA to maturity Our sample is from January 1996 to December 2010. Data on options are from Option Metrics. Straddles are constructed 3 days before earnings announcement, and then held until option expiration. In the case when one stock has more than one pair of short term at the money straddles, we adopt volume weighting. In Panel A, each quarter, we sort all straddles into 4 groups, based on days to maturity, or into 2 groups according to past bid-ask spread. Next, we average straddle returns for each of the groups. Panel B only includes options with maturities of between 4 and 10 days. We separate all straddles based on other relevant characteristics. In both panels, the means and t-statistics are computed across straddles in each group. Our sample is from January 1996 to December 2010. Data on options are from Option Metrics. The figure plots the time-series of both simple and delta-neutral straddle returns over different windows around earnings announcements, where day 0 is the earnings announcement day. In the case when one stock has more than one pair of at the money straddles, we equal weight straddles at stock level.
